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Abstract: This study examines whether foreign ownership share in investment projects affects the extent 
of spillovers from foreign direct investment. The analysis, based on a Romanian firm-level data set 
produces evidence consistent with positive intra-sectoral spillovers resulting from wholly-owned foreign 
affiliates but not from projects with joint domestic and foreign ownership. This finding is in line with the 
literature suggesting that foreign investors tend to put more resources into technology transfer to their 
wholly-owned projects than to those owned partially. Further, the data indicate that the presence of 
partially foreign-owned investments is correlated with higher productivity of domestic firms in upstream 
industries suggesting that domestic suppliers benefit from contacts with multinational customers. The 
opposite is true, however, in the case of wholly-owned foreign affiliates. These results are consistent with 
the observation that foreign investors entering a host country through greenfield projects are less likely to 
source locally than those engaged in joint ventures or partial acquisitions. They are also in line with the 
evidence suggesting that wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries use newer or more sophisticated technologies 
than jointly owned investment projects and thus may have higher requirements vis-à-vis suppliers. 
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Introduction 
While domestic equity ownership requirements had been extensively utilized by 
governments in developing countries, their incidence has sharply declined in recent years 
(UNCTAD, 2003). Increasingly competitive environment for foreign direct investment (FDI) as 
well as the need to comply with international commitments have put pressure on governments to 
relax restrictions vis-à-vis multinationals. One of the reasons for the existence of ownership 
sharing condition was the belief that local participation in foreign investment projects  reveals 
their proprietary technology and thus benefits domestic firms by facilitating technology 
diffusion. If this is indeed the case, are host countries depriving themselves of the potential 
technological benefits by allowing multinationals unrestricted ownership of their affiliates? 
The ownership structure is especially important if a multinational’s competitive 
advantage stems from its intangible assets. As it is difficult to write a contract that specifies all 
aspect of the rights to use intangible assets, local and foreign ownership sharing may result in 
knowledge dissipation. This problem can be reduced when the multinational is the sole owner of 
its affiliate.
1 Therefore, foreign investors may have an incentive to transfer more sophisticated 
technologies and management skills to their wholly-owned subsidiaries than to partially-owned 
affiliates.
2 As a result, wholly-owned investment project may present a larger potential for 
spillovers as they possess more sophisticated intangible assets.
3  The overall relationship 
between the share of foreign ownership and spillovers depends on the relative magnitudes of 
these two effects and is, therefore, ambiguous. 
  While a lot of research effort has been put into looking for the evidence of FDI 
spillovers,
4 little attention has been devoted to how the degree of foreign ownership affects this 
phenomenon.  The few studies that attempted to examine this question compared intra-industry 
                                                 
1 This argument is in line with the property rights approach developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and 
Moore (1990).  
2 For empirical evidence see Ramacharandran (1993) and Mansfield and Romero (1980). 
3 Alternatively, it is also possible that a higher technological gap between domestic and foreign firms will prevent 
technology diffusion. 
4 The existing firm level studies produce mixed results with respect to horizontal (i.e., intra-industry) spillovers from 
FDI in developing countries.  For instance, while Haddad and Harrison (1993), Aitken and Harrison (1999), 
Djankov and Hoekman (2000) and Konings (2000) fail to find a significant effect or produce evidence of negative 
spillovers, Kinoshita (2001) reaches an opposite conclusion for R&D intensive sectors in the Czech Republic and 
Damijan et al (2003) find evidence of positive horizontal spillovers in Romania but not in other transition 
economies.  The picture is more optimistic in the case of inter-industry, or vertical spillovers, taking place through 
contacts between domestic firms and their multinational customers, as Javorcik (2004) provides evidence consistent 
with the presence of positive FDI spillovers operating through this channel.   3
spillovers from minority- versus majority-owned foreign affiliates, and either found no 
statistically significant difference between the two (Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999, on 
Indonesia) or concluded that the former are associated with greater externalities (Dimelis and 
Louri, 2001, on Greece).  
This paper is a step forward in understanding the impact of the ownership structure on 
FDI spillovers. It extends the analysis to: (i) examine the difference between spillovers 
associated with wholly- and partially-owned foreign investments in addition to comparing the 
impact of majority- and minority-owned foreign projects; (ii) study both intra- (horizontal) as 
well as inter-industry (vertical) spillovers stemming from different types of foreign 
establishments, and (iii) account for the degree of concentration in the industry. Furthermore, this 
paper significantly improves upon the econometric techniques employed by Blomström and 
Sjöholm (1999) and Dimelis and Louri (2001) by controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity 
and taking into account simultaneity between input selection and firm productivity.
5 These 
improvements are possible as, unlike the earlier studies, we employ a firm level panel data set 
rather than cross-sectional information. 
Our results, based on a Romanian data set, suggest that the degree of foreign ownership 
matters for intra- as well as for inter-industry spillovers from FDI. We find that positive 
horizontal spillovers are linked to wholly-owned but not to partially-owned foreign projects. The 
difference between the effects from these two types of FDI is statistically significant. Based on 
the estimated coefficients, we find that a one-standard-deviation increase in the presence of 
wholly-owned foreign affiliates is associated with a 6.2 percent increase in the productivity of 
domestic firms operating in the same industry. This result suggests that the higher technological 
content of wholly-owned may outweigh the diffusion benefits of the shared ownership. 
The pattern of vertical spillovers is also consistent with our expectations. The results 
point to positive externalities being associated with partially-owned foreign projects which are 
hypothesized to rely more heavily on local suppliers.  On the other hand, wholly-owned foreign 
subsidiaries appear to have a negative effect on the productivity of domestic firms in upstream 
sectors.  This negative effect may be due to the possibility that after acquiring a domestic 
enterprise, foreign investors frequently upgrade production facilities and as a result demand more 
                                                 
5 Griliches and Mairesse (1995) argue that inputs should be considered endogenous since they are chosen by a firm 
based on its productivity, which is observed by the producer but not by the econometrician.  Not taking into account 
the endogeneity of input choices biases the estimated production function coefficients. Since the focus of this paper 
is on firm productivity, the consistency of the estimates is crucial for the analysis.   4
complex, higher quality inputs which leads to severing existing relationships with local suppliers 
and relying on imported inputs.  The subsequent decrease in demand for intermediates produced 
in Romania may prevent local producers from reaping the benefits of scale economies.
6  
This paper is structured as follows.  In the next section, we argue that the degree of 
foreign ownership matters for knowledge spillovers. Next, we discuss FDI inflows into Romania. 
Then we present our data, estimation strategy and the empirical results.  The last section 
concludes. 
 
Why Should the Degree of Foreign Ownership Influence the Extent 
of Spillovers?     
The ownership structure of FDI may affect the presence of horizontal (or intra-industry) 
spillovers in two ways.  First, fear of technology leakage, especially in countries with limited 
rule of law, may induce firms with most sophisticated technologies to shy away from shared 
ownership and instead choose to invest only in wholly-owned projects.
7 This outcome may also 
stem from the tradeoff between using a joint venture to secure a better position in the product 
market and sharing profits with the local partner, as illustrated in the theoretical contribution by  
Javorcik and Saggi (2004) whose model predicts that the more technologically advanced foreign 
investor is less likely to choose a joint venture and prefers to enter directly. Further, as 
Ramacharandran (1993) demonstrates, foreign investors tend to devote more resources to 
technology transfer to their wholly-owned subsidiaries than to partially-owned affiliates. In the 
same manner, Mansfield and Romeo (1980) point out that the transfer of technology is more 
rapid within wholly-owned networks of multinationals’ subsidiaries than to joint ventures or 
licensees. Similarly, Desai, Foley and Hines (2003) find evidence that majority and wholly-
owned affiliates receive more intangible property from their parents companies than do minority-
owned affiliates. In sum, wholly-owned investment project may present a larger potential for 
spillovers due to their higher technological content. On the other hand, it is generally believed by 
policy makers in developing countries that participation of local capital in a foreign investment 
                                                 
6  This finding is consistent with anecdotal evidence from the Czech Republic indicating that multinationals 
upgrading or changing the nature of their production may switch from local to global sourcing and thus drop their 
suppliers in a host country (KPMG 2002).  This result is also in line with the theoretical predictions of Saggi (2002) 
who shows that local suppliers of intermediates will be worse off after the entry of multinationals if the technology 
gap between local and foreign producers of final goods is large.   
7 For empirical evidence see Smarzynska and Wei (2000).   5
project reveals the multinational’s proprietary technology and thus facilitates spillovers 
(UNCTAD 2003, Blomström and Sjöholm, 1999). The overall relationship between the share of 
foreign ownership and spillovers is the result of these two forces and its sign is, therefore, 
ambiguous. 
Turning to the determinants of vertical (or inter-industry) spillovers, it has been argued 
that affiliates established through joint ventures or mergers and acquisitions are more likely to 
source their inputs locally than those taking form of greenfield projects (UNCTC, 2001).  While 
the latter need to put significant efforts into developing linkages with local suppliers, the former 
can take advantages of the supplier relationships of the acquired firm or the local partner.
 8  
Empirical evidence supporting this view has been found for Japanese investors (Belderbos et al., 
2001) and for Swedish affiliates in Eastern and Central Europe (UNCTC, 2000). On the other 
hand, anecdotal evidence also suggests that foreign investors acquiring local firms in transition 
countries tend to dramatically reduce the number of local suppliers as they integrate the 
subsidiary in the supplier network of the parent company.
9   
While in our dataset we cannot distinguish between acquisitions, joint ventures and 
greenfield projects, we have detailed information on the foreign equity share.  To the extent that 
full foreign ownership is a proxy for greenfield projects and full acquisitions, we expect that 
wholly-owned foreign affiliates will rely more on imported inputs, while investment projects 
with local capital will source more locally.
10  Therefore, we anticipate larger vertical spillovers to 
be associated with partially-owned foreign projects than with wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries.  
                                                 
8 Evidence from greenfield investments in Hungary confirms this point: Philips and Sony reported local content 
below 10 percent and General Motors and Volkswagen below 5 percent in 1999 (Case study in “How Important are 
Global Strategies and Local Linkages of Multinational Corporations?”, May 2003).   
9  One of the largest FDI projects in Romania, Renault’s purchase of an equity stake in Dacia, the local automobile 
maker, may serve as an example.  The initial transaction took place in 1999 with subsequent increases in Renault’s 
share in 2001and 2002.  After the acquisition, the French company promised to continue sourcing inputs from local 
suppliers provided they lived up to the expectations of the new owner.  This, however, does not seem to have been 
the case.  In 2002, eleven foreign suppliers of the French group were expected to start operating in Romania, thus 
replacing the Romanian producers from whom Dacia used to source (Ziarul Financiar (Financial Newspaper) April 
19, 2001).   
10  A recent survey of multinationals operating in Latvia provides support for this view as it shows that while 52 
percent of firms with joint domestic and foreign ownership had at least one local supplier of intermediate inputs, the 
same was true of only 9 percent of fully-owned foreign subsidiaries. Moreover, partially-owned foreign buyers  
reported offering more technical, managerial and financial assistance to their suppliers than fully-owned ones (FIAS 
2003).    
Further, the results of a study of the largest exporters in Hungary also indicate that foreign affiliates with larger 
share of foreign equity tend to purchase fewer inputs from Hungarian companies (Toth and Semjen 1999). Desai, 
Foley and Hines (2003) also found evidence that whole ownership is most common when firms integrate production 
activities across different locations.   6
This effect may be reinforced by the fact that wholly-owned foreign affiliates may use newer or 
more sophisticated technologies than their partially-owned counterparts and thus may have 
higher requirements vis-à-vis suppliers which only a handful of domestic firms, if any, would be 
able to meet. Furthermore, if wholly-owned foreign affiliates import a large portion of their 
inputs, they may even generate negative backward linkage effects. Such a scenario is illustrated 
in the theoretical contribution by Rodriguez-Clare (1996) where an increase in the importance of 
foreign firms relative to domestic enterprises leads to a reduction in input variety and 
specialization and thus results in a lower productivity of domestic producers of intermediates.  
So far we have concentrated only on knowledge spillovers associated with FDI. 
However, as postulated  by Aitken and Harrison (1999), the presence of multinationals may have 
yet another effect on domestic firms.  Foreign entrants may take some market share away from 
local companies operating in the same industry, thus forcing them to spread the fixed costs over 
a smaller production scale, increasing the average cost and resulting in a lower observed 
productivity.  While this effect may disappear in the long run as less competitive local producers 
exit, it may be observable in the period immediately following the foreign entry.
11 To take this 
possibility into account, we will control for the industry concentration in our analysis. 
 
FDI in Romania  
Compared to Central and Eastern European countries Romania was a late bloomer as an 
FDI destination in the region. The Romanian government's cautious approach to privatization 
and to transition in general, had led to relatively slow FDI inflows during the early 1990s. The 
situation changed dramatically in 1997 when substantial privatization efforts along with changes 
in the legislative framework provided new opportunities for foreign investors. As a result, the 
volume of FDI inflows in 1997 and 1998 was thirteen and twenty-one times larger, respectively, 
than the amount received in 1993 (see Table 1). In the following two years a slowdown was 
registered as FDI inflows decreased from 4.9 percent of GDP in 1998 to 3 percent in 1999 and 
2.8 percent in 2000. Nevertheless, the total FDI stock accumulated between 1993 and 2000, 
                                                 
11 A survey conducted by the World Bank found that 48 percent of Czech firms interviewed believed that the 
presence of multinationals increased the level of competition in their sector.  The same was true of two-fifth of 
Latvian enterprises.  Almost 30 percent of the firms in each country reported losing market share as a result of FDI 
inflows (Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2004).    7
equal to 6,429 million dollars, made Romania the fourth largest FDI recipient among ten 
countries in the region. 
At the end of 2000, there were 77,241 companies with foreign capital in Romania, which 
represented about 9 percent of all companies registered in the country.
12 Foreign companies 
played an important role in the Romanian economy accounting for two-fifths of sales and 
exports. About 45 percent of FDI stock in 2000 was concentrated in manufacturing industries, 
with the rest found mainly in trade and financial services. In terms of the distribution of FDI by 
the source country, at the end of 2000, 61 percent of the FDI stock was accounted for by 
investors from the European Union, 10 percent by the Asian capital and 8 percent by American 
investors (Hunya, 2002).  
 
Data Description 
The data used in this study come from the commercial database Amadeus compiled by 
Bureau van Dijk, which contains comprehensive information on companies operating in thirty-
five European countries, including Romania. The Amadeus database covers 387,357 firms 
registered in Romania.
13 In addition to the standard financial statements, Amadeus includes 
detailed information about the ownership structure of firms which allows us to determine the 
foreign equity stake in each company.  The ownership information pertains mostly to 2000 and 
1999 and no historical figures.
14  For this reason, we limit our analysis to an unbalanced panel 
spanning over the period 1998-2000.  We assume that firms which were foreign-owned in the 
year for which we have the ownership information were foreign-owned during the whole three-
year period.  However, this may not be a very strong assumption as greenfield investments 
accounted for about 50-60 percent of FDI inflows into Romania before 2002 (Voinea 2003), 
which is the period covered by our sample.  
Our sample includes firms with more than five employees in 1999.  We remove inactive 
firms, missing observations and outliers (i.e., observations in the top and bottom one percentile 
of all the firm-specific output and input variables).  We are left with 54,032 firms or 131,396 
                                                 
12 Source: http://www.factbook.ro/countryreports/ro/Ro_InvestmentClimate.htm 
13 The Amadeus database does not cover state owned enterprises or cooperatives. 
14 Despite this shortcoming many researchers studying European economies have employed the Amadeus data.  See, 
for instance, Budd, Konings and Slaughter (2002) and Konings and Murphy (2001).   8
firm-year observations, between 42,246 and 52,240 observations per year.  In 6,262 firms the 
foreign capital share exceeds ten percent of the total and thus we classify them as foreign firms. 
We also employ the input-output (IO) matrix provided by the Statistical Institute of 
Romania for the first year covered by the sample 1998.
15  The input-output matrix contains 105 
sectors and each firm in our dataset is matched with the IO sector classification based on its 
primary three-digit NACE code.  The concordances between the IO industry codes and three 
digits NACE codes can be obtained from the authors upon request.  All sectors of the economy 
are represented in our sample.  A detailed sectoral distribution of firms is presented in Appendix-
Table A. As summary statistics presented in Table 2 indicate, a large degree of heterogeneity is 
found in the case of outputs, inputs and ownership type. 
 
Empirical Strategy  
Model and Estimation Issues 
 
To examine the effect of foreign presence on productivity of domestic firms, we estimate 
a log-linear transformation of a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
ln Yit = αi + β1lnKit + β2lnLit + β3lnMit + β4Horizontal_Type1jt + β5Horizontal_Type2jt + 
+β6Vertical_Type1jt + β7Vertical_Type2jt + β8Concentrationjt + αt + εit     (1) 
 
where subscripts i, j and t refer to firm, industry and time, respectively. Yit stands for firm output. 
Kit, Lit and Mit represent production inputs: capital, labor, and materials. αi and αt capture firm 
and year effects, respectively. We define output as a firm’s turnover deflated by industry specific 
producer price indices at the three-digit NACE classification. We measure labor by the number 
of employees. Capital is proxied by the value of tangible fixed assets deflated using the GDP 
deflator.  Material inputs are deflated by a weighted average of the producer price indices of the 
supplying sectors. The weights are given by the input-output matrix and represent the proportion 
of inputs sourced from a given sector.  Concentrationjt is proxied by the Herfindahl index and 
                                                 
15  Ideally we would like to use multiple input-output matrices since relationships between sectors may change over 
the years or with FDI inflows, albeit radical changes are unlikely.  Unfortunately, input-output matrices for later 
years are not available.   9
controls for industry concentration. The index is defined as the sum of the squared market shares 
of the four largest producers in a given sector and its value ranges from 0 to 1.
16   
In addition to the standard production function variables, we include measures of foreign 
presence in the same sector (Horizontal) as well as in downstream sectors (Vertical), which are 
defined as follows.  Horizontaljt is the share of an industry j’s output produced by firms with at 
least ten percent foreign equity, calculated for each of the 105 industries.  Since we are interested 
in exploring spillovers stemming from different types of FDI projects, we calculate separately 
measures of foreign presence pertaining to minority- and majority-owned foreign investments as 
well as to partially- and wholly-owned foreign projects.  
  The variable Verticaljt is a proxy for the foreign presence in downstream sectors (i.e., 
sectors supplied by the industry to which the firm in question belongs) and thus is intended to 
capture the effect multinational customers have on domestic suppliers. It is defined in the 
following way: 
Verticaljt = Σk αjk Horizontalkt 
 
Where αjk is the proportion of sector j’s output used by sector k taken from the 1998 input-output 
matrix including 105 sectors.
17 We calculate two separate measures of Vertical: one for partially- 
and one for wholly-owned foreign projects by using the appropriate definition of Horizontal 
variables defined above.
18  For summary statistics on these and other variables see Table 2. 
We restrict our attention to domestic establishments to avoid a potential bias stemming 
from the fact that foreign investors tend to acquire stakes in large and most successful domestic 
companies (see Djankov and Hoekman, 2000).  We use firm fixed effects estimation in order to 
take into account the unobserved firm characteristics, such a managerial talent, access to 
financing, etc., which may affect firm productivity.  Doing so will allow us to control for time 
invariant determinants of productivity across firms that are also potentially correlated with FDI 
variables.  
                                                 
16 As pointed out by Nickell (1996), predictions of the theoretical literature with respect to the impact of competition 
on productivity are ambiguous. In the empirical analysis, however, he finds evidence of competition being positively 
correlated with a higher rate of productivity growth. 
17 In calculating αjk sector j’s output sold for final consumption was excluded.  
18 Note that we do not calculate separate measures of Vertical for minority and majority foreign projects, as there is 
no theoretical argument suggesting that they should be different.    10
Further, we employ the semi-parametric approach, suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) 
and modified by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), to control for the possibility that a firm’s private 
knowledge of its productivity (unobserved by the econometrician) may affect its input choices 
thus leading to biased estimates of the coefficients on factor shares.
19 This method allows for 
firm-specific productivity differences that exhibit idiosyncratic changes over time and thus 
addresses the simultaneity bias.  Since our study relies on correctly measuring firm productivity, 
obtaining consistent estimates of the production function coefficients is crucial to our analysis.  
 
Results 
We begin our analysis by examining the difference between horizontal spillovers 
associated with partially- and wholly-owned foreign projects.  We exploit the panel nature of our 
dataset and estimate a model with firm specific fixed affects. The results, presented in the first 
column of Table 3, indicate the presence of positive intra-industry spillovers, which are however, 
significant only in the case wholly-owned foreign establishments. This finding is consistent with 
the view that multinationals transfer newer technologies and invest more resources in knowledge 
transfer to their wholly-owned affiliates and thus such affiliates represent a greater potential for 
spillovers.
20  Moreover, there is a statistically significant difference in the magnitude of the 
coefficients associated with the two types of FDI.  
Next, we focus on vertical spillovers from FDI by adding to our model two measures of 
foreign presence in downstream sectors. We find that proxies for vertical spillovers exhibit a 
very different sign pattern.  Namely, partially-owned foreign projects appear to be associated 
with positive vertical spillovers, while full foreign ownership is correlated with lower 
productivity of domestic firms in upstream industries. The two coefficients as well as the 
difference between them are statistically significant at the one percent level. Their sign pattern is 
consistent with the hypothesis that foreign investors entering a host country through greenfield 
projects or full acquisitions are less likely to source their inputs locally than those who invested 
                                                 
19 See the Appendix for a detailed description of the method. 
20 Additional regressions (not reported here) performed on a combined sample of both domestic and foreign indicate 
that fully-owned foreign subsidiaries have higher productivity levels than partially-owned foreign projects and 
domestic firms.   11
through joint ventures or partial acquisitions.
21  This may be due to the fact that the former group 
faces higher costs of finding and establishing a local network of suppliers and that foreign 
owners tend to reduce the number of existing suppliers of the fully acquired enterprise as they 
integrate the subsidiary into their global supplier network.  
Finally, we add the Herfindahl index to the model in order to take into account the extent 
of industry concentration. This additional control may be important, since the estimates of 
spillover effects may capture the net impact of knowledge externalities and the competition 
effect. Our measure of industry concentration is statistically significant, but does not affect the 
signs or the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of the variables of interest. The 
concentration coefficient is negative and statistically significant suggesting that firms in more 
competitive industries exhibit higher productivity. 
The results presented so far do not take into account the possible simultaneity between 
productivity shocks and firm input choices.  To address this potentially serious problem, we 
apply the modified Olley and Pakes approach to estimate firm-specific total factor productivity 
(TFP) and then use it as the dependent variable in the second stage estimation.  As TFP estimates 
come from regressions estimated for each industry separately, the second stage model includes 
industry (but not firm) fixed effects. As several industries lack a sufficient number of 
observations to apply the Olley-Pakes procedure, the estimates presented in Table 4 are based on 
a smaller number of observations.  We estimate the second stage model in levels (columns 1 and 
2) as well as in first differences (columns 3 and 4). 
The results are broadly consistent with our previous findings.  First, we show that the 
share of foreign ownership matters for both horizontal and vertical spillovers.  In all regressions, 
the difference between spillovers associated with wholly- and partially-owned foreign projects is 
statistically significant.  This is true for both inter- and intra-industry effects. Second, as before 
the empirical evidence is consistent with positive spillovers from wholly-owned foreign 
investments taking place within sectors. The estimated coefficients are significant at the one 
percent level in all four regressions. Based on the estimated coefficients, we find that an increase 
in wholly-owned foreign presence by one standard deviation increases the productivity of 
domestic firms operating in the same industry by 6.2 percent. We find, however, a change with 
                                                 
21 About 50-60 percent of FDI inflows into Romania before 2002 took form of greenfield investments (Voinea 
2003), while full acquisitions accounted for 15 percent of  the total mergers and acquisitions (authors calculations 
based on Securities Data Corporation (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions Database).   12
respect to horizontal spillovers associated with partially foreign-owned projects. While in the 
levels regressions their effect is not statistically significant, the first difference results suggest 
that the performance of domestic firms is negatively correlated with partially foreign-owned 
projects in the same sector. This suggests that in the case of partially foreign-owned investments 
the negative competition effect may outweigh the impact of knowledge externalities. 
As in the earlier regressions, the data suggest that there exist significant negative effects 
associated with the presence of wholly foreign-owned projects in downstream sectors. Based on 
the estimated coefficients, a one-standard-deviation increase in the foreign presence in the 
downstream sectors decreases the productivity of domestic firms in the supplying by 2.5 percent. 
The first difference model also produces the evidence of a positive correlation between the 
presence of partially foreign-owned projects in downstream sectors and the productivity of 
domestic firms in upstream industries. As before, the results are robust to accounting for the 
extent of concentration in the industry.  
 
Robustness checks 
As a robustness check, we test whether our findings are driven by the distinction between 
the full and partial ownership or whether what matters is having a majority share and thus control 
over the enterprise management.  We start by narrowing our controls to include only proxies for 
the minority- and the majority-owned foreign establishments. The results, presented in Table 5,  
point to the presence of positive spillovers in the case of majority-owned foreign projects and to 
negative spillovers associated with the minority-owned foreign investments.  Moreover, there is 
a statistically significant difference in the magnitude of the coefficients associated with the two 
types of FDI.   
Next, we test whether the positive effects associated with the majority-owned owned 
foreign investments are driven by the wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries. Thus, we include three 
measures of Horizontal: minority (pertaining to firms with 10-50 percent of foreign share), 
majority-but-not-wholly-owned (above 50 but less than 100 percent foreign ownership) and 
wholly-owned (100 percent foreign ownership).  We find that in both types of regressions the 
positive and statistically significant effect is associated only with wholly-owned foreign 
subsidiaries. The test of equality of coefficients reveals a significant difference between the   13
effects associated with the three types of FDI.  Finally, we add proxies for vertical spillovers and 
the Herfindhal index but the results remain unchanged. 
We repeat the exercise using a first difference specification.  The coefficients on the 
Horizontal variables follow the same pattern as in the model in levels, with the exception of 
spillovers from majority-but-not-wholly-owned investments which now become statistically 
significant but their effect is much smaller than that of fully-owned FDI projects.  Again the 
difference between the two coefficients is statistically significant at the one percent level. 
Finally, we perform yet another robustness check, not reported here, by narrowing our 
sample to manufacturing firms only. The results for the manufacturing sector confirm our 
previous findings that domestic firms’ productivity is positively associated with the presence of 
wholly-owned foreign firms in the same sector and negatively associated with the presence of 
wholly-owned firms in downstream sectors. The results are robust to using both the levels and 
the first difference specifications. The coefficient on the proxy for horizontal spillovers is 
statistically insignificant in the case of partially foreign-owned subsidiaries. The proxies for 
vertical spillovers follow the same pattern as before. In sum, the additional robustness checks 




Governments of developing countries often favor joint ventures over wholly-owned 
FDI projects believing that active participation of local firms facilitates the absorption of new 
technologies and know-how.  To test whether this belief is warranted, this paper tests whether 
there is a difference in the magnitude of horizontal and vertical spillovers associated with 
different degrees of foreign ownership.  We find evidence consistent with positive horizontal 
spillovers resulting from wholly-owned foreign establishments but not from partially-owned 
foreign projects.  This finding is in line with the literature suggesting that foreign investors 
tend to put more resources into technology transfer to their wholly-owned projects than into 
joint ventures. This result implies that the higher technological content of wholly-owned may 
outweigh the diffusion benefits of shared ownership. 
A different pattern emerges in the case of vertical spillovers.  The data indicate that the 
presence of partially-owned foreign projects is correlated with higher productivity of domestic   14
firms in upstream industries suggesting that domestic suppliers of intermediates may benefit 
from contacts with multinational customers.  The opposite is true, however, in the case of 
wholly-owned foreign establishments which appear to have a negative effect on domestic firms 
in upstream sectors.  The latter finding is consistent with the observation that foreign investors 
entering a host country through greenfield projects are less likely to rely on local sourcing due 
to costs associated with finding domestic suppliers.  This result is also supported by the 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that after a full acquisition of a domestic enterprise, 
multinationals tend to reduce the number of suppliers often severing existing links with 
domestic firms in upstream sectors.   15
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Table 1.  FDI Inflows into Central and Eastern Europe, 1993-2000 
 
   FDI inflow (millions of US$) 
   1993  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1993-2000
 
Poland  1,715 1,875 3,659 4,498 4,908 6,365 7,270 9,342 39,632   
 
Czech Republic  654  878 2,568 1,435 1,286 3,700 6,313 4,583  21,417   
 
Hungary  2,350 1,144 4,519 2,274 2,167 2,037 1,977 1,692 18,159   
 
Romania  94  341  419  263 1,215 2,031 1,041 1,025  6,429   
 
Slovak Republic  199 270 236 351 174 562 354  2,052 4,198   
 
Bulgaria  40 105  90 109 505 537 806  1,002 3,194   
 
Latvia  45 214 180 382 521 357 348 407 2,454   
 
Lithuania  30  31  73 152 355 926 486 379 2,432   
 
Estonia  162 214 201 150 266 581 305 387 2,268   
 
Slovenia  113 128 177 194 375 248 181 181 1,597   
 
       Source: IMF International Financial Statistics 
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Obs. Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
         
Sales (th. Lei 1995)  131,396  7,113.6  11,498.8  17.8  208,280.0 
Fixed assets (th. Lei 1995)  131,396  1,399.9  3,757.3  0.004  56,666.2 
Materials (th. Lei 1995)  131,396  5,265.0  9,042.1  8.4  102,814.1 
Number of Employees   131,396  20.4  37.1  2.0  410.0 
         
Horizontal minority   131,396  0.033  0.02  0  0.29 
Horizontal majority  131,396  0.146  0.07  0  0.88 
Horizontal partially-owned  131,396  0.107  0.04  0  0.81 
Horizontal majority-  but not wholly-
owned  131,396 0.740  0.03  0  0.80 
Horizontal wholly-owned  131,396  0.072  0.05  0  0.67 
         
Vertical partially-owned  131,396  0.062  0.04  0  0.70 
Vertical wholly-owned  131,396  0.040  0.02  0  0.21 
         
Concentration measure  131,396  0.0028  0.0155  0.000  0.564 
   20
Table 3. Fixed Effects Regressions Results 
 
  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects  Fixed Effects 
       
Horizontal partially-owned [10,100)  -0.068    -0.023  -0.029 
  [0.045]  [0.045]  [0.045] 
Horizontal wholly-owned [100]  0.371***    0.401*** 0.435*** 
  [0.044]    [0.044] [0.045] 
        
Vertical partially-owned  0.591*** 0.641*** 0.648*** 
   [0.061] [0.062] [0.062] 
Vertical wholly-owned  -1.284*** -1.259*** -1.275*** 
   [0.076] [0.076] [0.076] 
      
Concentration     -0.611*** 
       [0.128] 
        
Ln fixed assets  0.038***  0.037***  0.037***  0.037*** 
 [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001]  [0.001] 
Ln materials  0.746***  0.747***  0.747***  0.746*** 
 [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
Ln labor  0.170***  0.168***  0.168***  0.168*** 
 [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002]  [0.002] 
        
Year Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Firm Specific Dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes 
        
No. of observations  131,396  131,396  131,396  131,396 
Adj. R squared  0.86  0.86  0.87  0.87 
        
F test for equal coefficients on Horizontal  48.88    45.9 54.02 
Prob. > F test Horizontal  0.00    0.00 0.00 
        
F test for equal coefficients on Vertical  467.36 478.77 488.91 
Prob. > F test Vertical  0.00 0.00 0.00 
The dependent variable is firm output.  Standard errors are listed in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote significance at the one, five 
and ten percent level, respectively. 
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Table 4.  Olley and Pakes Regressions Results 
 
  Levels  Levels  First Differences  First Differences
             
Horizontal partially-owned  -0.094  -0.12  -0.287** -0.287** 
 [0.202]  [0.202]  [0.126] [0.127] 
       
Horizontal wholly-owned  1.187*** 1.277***  1.060***  1.205*** 
  [0.200] [0.201]  [0.134]  [0.127] 
        
Vertical partially-owned  -0.057  -0.034  1.004*** 1.062*** 
 [0.400]  [0.400]  [0.285] [0.286] 
       
 
Vertical wholly-owned  -1.605*** -1.648***  -1.181***  -1.220*** 
  [0.390] [0.391]  [0.236]  [0.236] 
        
        
Concentration     -1.489**    -2.175*** 
   [0.597]    [0.383] 
       
       
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry Dummies  Yes  Yes  No  No 
First Difference  No  No  Yes  Yes 
        
No. of observations  117,668  117,668  71,517  71,517 
       
F test for equal coefficients on Horizontal  20.83 24.36  63.39  80.58 
Prob. > F test Horizontal  0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00 
       
F test for equal coefficients on Vertical  8.46 9.17  38.38  41.52 
Prob. > F test Vertical  0.003 0.003  0.00  0.00 
        
The dependent variable is firm productivity calculated for each industry separately using the Olley-
Pakes procedure.  Standard errors are listed in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 
one, five and ten percent level, respectively.  Table 5. Olley and Pakes Regression Results  - Robustness Checks 
 
First First First First
  Levels Levels Levels Levels 
Differences Differences Differences Differences
   
Horizontal minority foreign owned [10,50]  -0.810** -0.761** -1.016*** -1.097***  -1.549*** -1.506*** -1.697*** -1.783***
  [0.374] [0.375] [0.378] [0.380]  [0.217] [0.218] [0.219] [0.218]
Horizontal majority foreign owned (50,100]  0.833*** 0.652***
  [0.153] [0.105]
Horizontal majority (excluding wholly owned) (50,100) 0.265 0.356 0.354 0.159 0.341** 0.380**
  [0.249] [0.250] [0.250]  [0.158] [0.161] [0.161]
Horizontal wholly-owned [100]  1.197*** 1.176*** 1.272***  0.981*** 1.059*** 1.218***
  [0.198] [0.200] [0.201]  [0.132] [0.136] [0.127]
   
Vertical partially-owned 0.039 0.069  1.141*** 1.212***
  [0.400] [0.401]  [0.285] [0.285]
Vertical wholly-owned  -1.754*** -1.808***  -1.357*** -1.410***
  [0.393] [0.394]  [0.237] [0.238]
   
Concentration   -1.600*** -2.364***
  [0.598]  [0.382]
   
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes  No No No No
First Difference  No No No No  Yes Yes Yes Yes
   
No. of observations 117,668 117,668 117,668 117,668 71,517 71,517 71,517 71,517
   
F test for equal coefficients on Horizontal  16.4 4.88 8.63 9.57 84.51 36.07 53.55 60.7
Prob. > F test Horizontal  0.001 0.027 0.003 0.002  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  (min vs. maj) (min vs. maj) (min vs. maj) (min vs. maj)  (min vs. maj) (min vs. maj) (min vs. maj) (min vs. maj)
   
F test for equal coefficients on Horizontal  8.43 6.52 8.15  17.92 13.49 18.98
Prob. > F test Horizontal  0.004 0.011 0.004  0.00 0.00 0.00
  (maj vs fully) (maj vs fully) (maj vs fully)  (maj vs fully) (maj vs fully) (maj vs fully)
   
F test for equal coefficients on Horizontal  22.01 27.34 31.16  100.92 121.19 149.82
Prob. > F test Horizontal  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00
  (min vs. fully) (min vs. fully) (min vs. fully)  (min vs. fully) (min vs. fully) (min vs. fully)
   
F test for equal coefficients on Vertical  11.17 12.19  49.55 54.21
Prob. > F test Vertical  0.001 0.00  0.00 0.00
The dependent variable is firm productivity calculated for each industry separately using the Olley-Pakes procedure.
 Standard errors are listed in parentheses.  ***, **, * denote significance at the one, five and ten percent level, respectively.Appendix 
Estimation Details 
 
We employ the semi-parametric estimation of the production function parameters, as 
suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996) and modified by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), to account 
for the simultaneity bias.  To illustrate the method, we start with the following production 
function: 
 
vait = yit - mit = α + βl *lit +βk *kit +ωit + ηit  (1) 
  
where va stands for value added (i.e., output minus material inputs), l and k for labor and capital, 
respectively, and i and t are subscripts denoting firm and year. Capital is treated as a state 
variable, while labor and materials are assumed to be freely variable inputs. ηit represents the 
error term capturing unpredictable shocks, while ωit is a productivity shock which is unobserved 
by the econometrician but known to the firm. Firms adjust their variable inputs based on their 
anticipation or knowledge of the productivity component (ωit). Since there exists a correlation 
between the error term (ωit + ηit) and the explanatory variables, a simple OLS procedure leads to 
inconsistent parameter estimates.  
The insight of the method is that the observable characteristics of the firm can be 
modeled as a monotonic function of its productivity. Inverting such a function allows for 
expressing the unobserved component of the productivity in terms of the observed variables. 
While Olley and Pakes (1996) use investment to model the unobserved productivity shock we 
follow Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) and employ materials inputs to correct for the simultaneity 
bias (as was done by Hallward-Driemeier et al., 2001).  We do so because of the lack of reliable 
information on investment expenditures.  The advantage of using intermediate inputs is that they 
generally respond to the entire productivity term, while investment may respond only to the 
‘news’ in the unobserved term.  Further, intermediate inputs provide a simpler link between the 
estimation strategy and the economic theory, primarily because they are not typically state 
variables.  
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The demand for material inputs can be modeled as a monotonic function of the capital 
stock and the unobserved productivity shock.   
 
mit = f(kit, ωit)  (2) 
 
Assuming the function f(.) is invertible, the unobservable productivity shock can be expressed as 
a function of observable variables.  
 
ωit = h(mit ,kit)   (3) 
 
We assume that materials are a variable input whose choice is affected by ωit while capital is 
determined by past values of productivity only. Substituting (3) into (1), we get the equation to 
be estimated in the first stage of the procedure: 
 
vait = α + βl *lit +βk *kit +  h(mit ,kit) + ηit   (4) 
 
Note that the functional form of h(.) is not known. Therefore, βk cannot be obtained at this stage.  
We estimate equation (4) using a third order polynomial expansion in capital and materials to 
approximate the unknown form of h(.).  From this stage we obtain the consistent estimate of the 
labor input coefficient as well as the estimate of the third order polynomial in mit and kit, to which 
we refer as ψit. 
 
ψit= βk *kit +  h(mit ,kit)   (5)  
 
Thus, h(mit ,kit)= ψit - βk *kit    (6) 
 
We proceed with the second stage where we estimate the effect of capital on output.  
Let’s consider the expectation of vat+1  -  βl  *lt+1 conditional on the information at time t. 
Assuming that ωit follows a first order Markov process, one can rewrite ωit+1 as a function of ωit, 
letting ξit+1 be the innovation in ωit+1.   And ωit can be replaced with a function of h(mit,kit). 
Therefore the equation to be estimated in the second stage becomes:   25
 
vait+1 - βl *lit+1 =c + βk *kit+1 + g( hit(.)) + ξit+1 + ηit+1   (7) 
 
Since the functional form of g(.) is not known, we use once more the third order polynomial 
expansion. Since the capital in use in a given period is assumed to be known at the beginning of 
the period and ξit+1 is mean independent of all variables known at the beginning of the period, 
ξit+1 is mean independent of kit+1.  The consistent coefficient βk can thus be obtained by running 
non linear least squares on equation (7). 
We use the above procedure to generate time-varying firm-specific measures of 
productivity that are consistent even in the presence of input shares being influenced by the 
private knowledge of firm’s productivity. We perform the estimation for each sector separately 
and the obtained measures of productivity are then used in the analysis of spillover effects. As 
the procedure described above calls for using lagged variables, we employ a longer panel 1996-
2000 to obtain the productivity estimates, but in the subsequent analysis of spillovers the 
timeframe is restricted to 1998-2000 
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Table A.  Distribution of Firms with Foreign Capital by Industry  
Industry code    Domestic 
Firms  Firms with Foreign Capital    Total 
      <10%   10<=FO<50   50<=FO<100  FO=100     
              
1   798  12  30  21   861 
3   94  2  2  1   99 
6   26  0  0  0   26 
8   543  10  27  26   606 
9   37  1  5  1   44 
13   673  7  11  5   696 
14   44  2  3  2   51 
15   14  1  1  0   16 
16   82  0  3  1   86 
18   646  20  28  26   720 
19   27  0  0  2   29 
20   134  4  10  11   159 
21   62  0  7  5   74 
22   298  9  11  7   325 
23   461  18  21  21   521 
24   18  1  2  3   24 
25   2164  49  150  116   2479 
26   343  17  27  23   410 
28   1807  45  139  213   2204 
29   87  4  3  7   101 
30   30  1  2  0   33 
31   379  6  50  90   525 
32   1183  31  104  91   1409 
33   138  12  25  13   188 
34   1010  46  68  45   1169 
36   7  0  1  3    11 
38   74  6  10  9   99 
40   59  3  7  3   72 
41   90  6  4  5   105 
42   54  3  8  17    82 
43   63  2  3  3   71 
44   3  1  0  0    4 
45   112  5  6  8   131 
46   274  21  34  40   369 
47   110  4  11  6   131 
48   57  3  5  5   70 
49   8  0  0  0    8 
50   90  0  8  5   103 
51   11  0  1  1   13 
52   98  5  4  4   111 
53   52  0  5  1   58 
54   14  0  5  2   21 
55   13  0  2  5   20   27
56   9  0  2  1    12 
57   9  1  1  1    12 
58   20  1  7  3   31 
59   65  1  3  5   74 
60   1014  24  49  53   1140 
61   41  2  7  3   53 
62   78  5  9  5   97 
63   21  0  6  1   28 
64   41  1  6  6   54 
65   67  1  12  7   87 
67   37  4  4  5   50 
68   98  8  13  15    134 
69   141  6  15  18   180 
70   54  11  6  10    81 
71   109  6  11  11   137 
72   89  5  8  4   106 
73   69  1  4  2   76 
74   17  0  1  0   18 
77   551  18  49  40   658 
78   191  3  19  21   234 
79   18  0  2  0   20 
80   4  0  3  1    8 
81   43  1  1  1   46 
82   71  0  0  0   71 
83   4193  60  86  54   4393 
84   19900  385  904  887   22076 
85   321  8  20  13   362 
86   2065  26  73  46   2210 
87   8  1  2  2    13 
88   1528  40  111  117   1796 
90   30  1  4  2   37 
91   9  1  0  1    11 
92   113  7  8  13   141 
93   275  9  24  28   336 
95   234  11  16  17   278 
97   214  7  19  11   251 
98   376  20  49  54   499 
99   78  2  2  4   86 
100   541  18  30  16   605 
101   1150  38  91  100   1379 
102   13  0  1  0   14 
103   142  3  1  4   150 
104   208  3  21  10   242 
105   1228  26  100  58   1412 
Total   47770  1122  2643  2497    54032 
FO stands for share of foreign capital in total firm’s equity.  Industry codes correspond to sector codes  
used in the input-output matrix.   
 